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I. Introduction
"NAFFA will enhance environmental protection throughout North
America."'
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
NAFTA is "perhaps the greenest trade agreement ever negotiated in the
world."2
- Linda Fisher, EPA Assistant
Administrator under President Bush
"NAFTA as written would have a profound negative effect on the environ-
ment. . .3
- Brent Blackwelder, Friends of the Earth
Such comments typify the polemic rhetoric often used by free
trade advocates and environmentalists during clashes over the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 4 Although Canadians
have debated free trade since negotiations began for the original
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988,5 this debate first
captured the American public during the 1992 presidential campaign.
Since the signing of NAFTA on December 17, 1992, negotiations over
side agreements on labor and the environment 6 plus an unexpected
decision in U.S. District Court 7 have kept the issue in the spotlight.
1 U.S. ENvrL. PROTECTON AGENCY, NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT].
2 US.-Mexico Environmental Accord Expected to be Signed Soon, Fisher Says, Int'l Env't Daily
(BNA) (Sept. 14, 1992).
3 Citizen Groups Blast Clause in NAFTA Text, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1730
(Oct. 7, 1992).
4 NAFTA is an agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States to eliminate
tariff and non-tariff barriers between the three countries. The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., available in Westlaw, NAFrA Library.
5 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851
(1988).
6 See NAFTA Negotiators Hit Roadblock overDisfute Settlement Procedures, 16 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 11, at 393 (June 2, 1993).
7 Federal District CourtJudge Charles Richey directed the Trade Representative to file
an Environmental Impact Statement on NAFTA. Public Citizen v. Office of the United States
Trade Representative, (D.D.C. 822 F. Supp. 21 1993), rev'd, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 24660 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) .
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One obstacle in the way of any free trade zone is concern over the
effect free trade will have on the environment. It is not surprising that
free trade advocates and environmentalists8 disagree over NAFTA; cer-
tain of their fundamental precepts differ. Free trade advocates desire a
world market free from government control, whereas many environ-
mentalists advocate the use of government controls to force environ-
mentally conscious behavior.9 Both sides argue vigorously, yet the
paucity of empirical evidence undermines all arguments. As the intro-
duction to the World Bank's Discussion Paper on International Trade
and the Environment states: "This volume plainly demonstrates how
much remains to be done in advancing our understanding of the many
complex factors that influence the interaction of trade and the
environment." 10
Measuring the effect of trade policy on the environment is an in-
herently murky task. First, a myriad of macro- and micro-economic,
social, and political conditions co-exist in the world. Isolating the sta-
tistical effects of individual trade policy from this soup is more difficult
than isolating bacteria from pond water. That some have produced
noteworthy empirical evidence is commendable, but any far-flung con-
clusions are suspect.
Second, the term "environmental quality" itself is a dauntingly am-
biguous term. Change is a constant of life and every organism alters
the environment in some way. Is environmental quality to be under-
stood as the absence of human alteration of the ecosphere or as the
ability of humans to survive and prosper in a chaotic universe?
Third, economic growth affects the environment in a wide variety
of ways that preclude simple analysis. Hazardous waste, air and water
pollution, natural resource depletion, sewage, chloroflourocarbons,
and estuarine development represent a few current environmental
problems, and various policies affect these problems in different
ways." Some of these problems are easily correctable while others may
8 Environmentalists themselves are split over the environmental effects of NAFTA. En-
vironmental Groups Line Up To Oppose Support Trade Pact, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Sept. 16,
1993).
9 NAFTA Embodies Regulatoiy Conflict Beween Environment, Trade, Official Says, 24 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 16 (May 7, 1993).
10 Patrick Low, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 12 (World
Bank Discussion Papers No. 159, Patrick Low ed., 1992).
11 According to the World Bank, three patterns emerge from the impact of rising eco-
nomic activity upon the environment. First, under certain circumstances there is a direct
positive relationship between increasing income and local human health/environmental
problems, such as sanitation and energy needs. Second, some problems, including air and
water pollution plus aspects of deforestation, "initially worsen but then improve as incomes
rise." WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 10 (1992) (hereinafter WORLD DEVELOP-
MENT REPORT]. This improvement occurs after nations implement environmentally friendly
policies. Third, certain environmental problems, including municipal wastes and carbon
and nitrogen emissions, continue to worsen as incomes rise. Environmental costs are not
tied to use or production, so few economic incentives exist to help curb this set of pollution
problems. Id.
1993]
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have no human solution.
This Comment is composed of two parts. First, this Comment will
isolate and analyze the main arguments advanced in favor of free trade
as they relate to environmental concerns. Second, it will focus more
narrowly on NAFTA by describing the proposed legal structure and
procedure of NAFTA and by analyzing the Agreement's potential im-
pact on the environment of NAFTA countries. The burden of proof
mechanism and Annex 2004 (the Nullification and Impairment
Clause) will be examined closely. This overview will provide perspec-
tive on both the overall free trade environment argument and the pos-
sible effect of NAFTA on the environment.
To limit its expansive scope, this Comment will focus on the re-
cent World Bank Discussion on International Trade and the Environ-
ment.12 The World Bank Discussion features studies and arguments by
economists, professors, and environmentalists on a variety of topics
within the free trade environment debate and is representative of cur-
rent arguments on the subject.'i The Discussion has been widely
quoted and relied upon not only by the World Bank,' 4 but by interna-
tional trade organizations' 5 and NAFTA governments as well.' 6
II. Free Tade: A Boon to Environmental Quality or an Ecological
Disaster?
Free trade advocates argue that free trade will benefit the environ-
ment. This part of the Comment will examine the following four pil-
lars of this argument:
(1) Free trade increases the economic wealth of all nations;
(2) As a nation's income increases, environmental quality
improves;
(3) The more open a national economy is to market influence,
the less severe the environmental impact of that economy will be;
and
(4) Industry will not relocate to lesser developed countries to
take advantage of looser environmental standards.
These supporting pillars of argument become increasingly focused
12 INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (World Bank Discussion Papers No.
159, Patrick Low ed., 1992) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRADE].
13 For another collection of ideas on the subject, see ORG. FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AND DEv., SUMMARY REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON ENVIRONMENTAL POuCES AND INDUSTRIAL
COMPETITIVENESS (1993).
14 See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 11, at 67 (citing Patrick Low's study
asserting that environmental costs constitute only a small portion of industry costs).
15 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE '90-'91 at 31, 38
(1992) (citing Low's study asserting environmental costs are only a small part of industry
costs and the Birdsall and Wheeler study concluding that "openness to trade and foreign
investment has been associated with less pollution intensity in Latin American countries").
16 See NAFrA AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 1 (stating "independent studies"
hold that as national income increases, pollution levels decrease).
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from (1) to (4) and increasingly substantiated by reliable evidence
rather than philosophical conjecture.
A. Free Trade and Economic Wealth
Instead of embarrassing commerce under piles of regulating laws, duties and
prohibitions, could it be relieved from all its shackles in all parts of the world,
could every country be employed in producing that which nature has best fitted
it to produce, and each be free to exchange with others mutual surpluses for
mutual wants, the greatest mass possible would then be produced of those things
which contribute to human life and human happiness; the numbers of man-
kind would be increased, and their condition bettered .... 17
- Thomas Jefferson
The first leg of the free trade argument concerns the general wel-
fare of all nations as a result of open trade. Although this topic might
seem to fall outside the scope of an environmentally oriented discus-
sion and will only be lightly touched upon here, poverty is increasingly
recognized as one important environmental hazard (and in some
minds, the greatest such hazard).18 Free trade policies are credited
with world-wide economic progress and this conclusion is not without
support.19 But will free trade improve the fortunes of the poorest?
Joshua DeWind, Director of the Immigration Research Program at
Columbia University, studied the impact of international development
assistance on Haiti, and his conclusions illustrate how general blanket
statements often do not tell the whole story. DeWind links attempts to
achieve an export-driven economy with the perpetuation of an under-
class in Haiti.20 Haiti's comparative advantage in the world economy is
cheap labor,21 and this advantage has been exploited in assembly in-
dustries and agricultural export.22 Yet most production is exported,
leaving Haitian workers to consume imported goods and food expen-
sive enough to exhaust any meager earnings from their export-related
jobs.23  Furthermore, despite international assistance, earnings
dropped seventeen percent from 1971 to 1985.24 Because land and
17 THE LIFE AND SELECrED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSor 319-20 (Adrienne Koch &
William Peden eds., 1944).
18 According to the World Bank, world poverty levels in 1990 exceeded 1.1 billion peo-
pie (with the poverty line at $420 annual per capita income). "Alleviating poverty is both a
moral imperative and a prerequisite for environmental sustainability. The poor are both
victims and agents of environmental damage. About half of the world's poor live in rural
areas that are environmentally fragile...." WoRL DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 11, at
30-32.
19 See, e.g., WoRLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 11, at 32 (projecting GDP in devel-
oping countries to increase by 5% per year for the last decade of the century due to eco-
nomic reform).
20 JosHuA DEWrND & DAVI KINLEY III, AIDING MIGRATtON: INTERNATIONAL AssiSTANCE
IN HAnm (1988).
21 Id. at 144.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. (citing WORLD BANK, REPORT No. 5601-HA, HAm: Poucv PROPOSALS FOR
GRowrH 51 (1985)).
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industry are in the hands of a few, trade benefits only the few; the
majority are left as a perpetual source of cheap labor. DeWind feels
unrestricted free trade may be an efficient, yet Darwinian system
whereby world economic growth is enhanced at the expense of the
disadvantaged. Consequently, he advocates the Jeffersonian vision of
regional self-sufficiency 2 5 with the limited trade of surpluses rather
than essentials.2 6
Beyond the simplicity of economic models, free trade advocates
accept the limitations on trade as a vehicle for sustainable develop-
ment. According to the World Bank: "[I]t is equitable economic
growth, coupled with education and health services, that is most ur-
gently needed. This will enable the poor to make environmental in-
vestments that are in their own long-term interest."27 When pressed,
probably only a few hold to a belief in the ultimate goodness of com-
pletely unrestrained trade. Gross economic inequalities stimulate con-
tinued upheaval and war causing environmental losses which may
exceed any theoretical gains.28 If the condition of the poorest is not
improved by free trade, these resulting environmental losses them-
selves argue against a simplistic free trade model.
B. Income Growth and Environmental Quality
This second leg of the free trade environment argument extols
the virtue of wealth in improving environmental quality. But even
within the free trade camp there is disagreement as to whether envi-
ronmental improvement through cleaner production and other fea-
tures of economic development outweigh the detrimental impact of
increased consumption. There is also disagreement over what "envi-
ronmental quality" means. To illustrate these divisions, this part
presents: (1) a review of definitional issues; (2) two theories to ex-
plain, in general terms, the possible impact economic growth has on
the environment; and (3) additional evidence to cast light on these
theories.
25 According to Thomas Jefferson, free trade works for the common good when "mu-
tual surpluses for mutual wants" are exchanged instead of the complete export of products
necessary for local sustenance. Self-sufficiency and mutual trade are the hallmarks of the
Jefferson-DeWind approach. See THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITING Ov THOMASJEFFERSON supra
note 17.
26 "Priority would be placed on organizing Haiti's productive resources to meet the
population's consumption needs through domestic markets rather than to produce exports
for the international market." DEWIND & KiNLEY, supra note 20, at 154.
27 WOaLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 11, at 32.
28 There seems to be little emphasis on the study of the effects of war on the environ-
ment. Presumably, the effect of different economic policies on the incidence of social up-
heaval may be too difficult to study. However, this highlights how many indirect variables in
the free trade environment question are not taken into account, yet may ultimately be more
important than those variables studied. The rape of the Persian Gulf environment during
the Gulf War and the destruction of the Southeast Asian forest during the Vietnam War are
two examples.
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1. What is Environmental Quality?
In an argument where definitions are sometimes as important as
empirical data, the term "environmental quality" evokes dispute. Pro-
fessor Marian Radetzki defines environmental quality in terms of the
capability for human survival and human well-being.29 Thus, eco-
nomic growth can readily improve environmental quality.30 Theoreti-
cally, environmental quality would improve even as species disappear.
Any other definition, Radetzki feels, would be hopelessly subjective.
Environmentalists, on the other hand, define environmental qual-
ity more in terms of the ability of the earth to support a myriad of
biological species. Humans intrude upon and upset this ecological bal-
ance. Economic growth increases the potential for intrusion, thereby
harming environmental quality. This divergence of opinion mirrors
the debate over natural resource valuation under Superfund,3 1 where
natural resources can be valued in terms of human consumption alone
or with an inherent value.3 2
2. Theories
a. Radetzki Theory-Net Environmental Gain
Scientific theory teaches that the environment places natural con-
straints on the limit of human expansion and development.3 3 Some
free trade advocates, however, have challenged the notion that as con-
sumption increases, environmental degradation necessarily results.3 4
As Professor Radetzki writes: "The plausible belief that environmental
conditions tend to deteriorate as economic activity intensifies, finds
very limited support in empirical facts. More often, increasing levels
and densities of economic activity are accompanied by improved envi-
ronmental conditions."3 5 This theory is based on some, or all, of the
following considerations:
(1) Humans adjust their behavior to avoid environmental catas-
trophe whenever their well-being and survival is threatened;3 6
2 "Two central characteristics of a good environment are that it should provide for
human survival and well-being." WoRa DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 11, at 122.
30 Id.
31 For an extensive article on natural resource valuation, see Frank B. Cross, Natural
Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VnD. L. REv. 269 (1989).
32 Id. at 270.
33 Thomas Malthus was largely responsible for the theory that human population, like
any species, can increase in population only to the extent the environment will support that
population. As a species' numbers near that limit, the lack of food, shelter, protection from
disease and predators, and other environmental factors will restrain population growth. See
Marian Radetzki, Economic Growth and Environment, in INTERNATIoNAL TAD.E, supra note 12, at
121, 123 (discussing Malthusian concerns, past and present, as "the main argument against
unlimited economic expansion").
34 Id.
35 Id. at 134.
36 Id.
1993]
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(2) The rich are more willing and able to adjust their consump-
tion to improve environmental conditions;3 7
(3) Wealth increases the opportunity for pro-environment tech-
nological advances;38
(4) As an economy matures, there is a shift from heavy industry to
less damaging high-tech industries and services;3 9
(5) Property rights develop as consumption reduces the amount
of natural stock (forest, fish, etc.); 40 and
(6) Poverty, a root cause of much environmental damage, is
alleviated. 41
Economists can use this theory to explain the staggering growth of
environmental problems in developing countries during periods of
great economic growth. 42 Professor Radetzki conjectures that environ-
mental wear (the amount of environmental services consumed per
unit Gross Domestic Product(GDP) generated) takes the shape of an
inverted-U. 43 When an economy is in the early to middle stages of de-
velopment, it draws heavily upon environmental resources for its in-
dustry and infrastructure. Hence, there may be an upsurge in
pollution. As the economy further matures, service industries (bank-
ing, insurance, etc.) replace the industrial sector, thereby reducing en-
vironmental wear. 44  Technological advances produce clean
technology that further buttresses this effect.45 Environmental wear is
to be expected in early stages of economic development and should
not be shied away from.46 Eventually, the apex of this curve is reached
and further economic growth improves environmental quality. By clos-
ing the system to free-market tendencies, the environment is harmed
through the stunting of this growth curve before its optimum is
achieved.
To support this view, Radetzki notes that as Western economic
density4 7 has increased, water quality in the Rhine has improved,
sulphur dioxide emissions in Northwestern Europe have lessened, and
mortality rates from environmentally-borne typhoid have plummeted.
37 Id. at 132-34.
38 Id. at 132.
39 Id. at 130-32.
40 Id. at 129-30.
41 WoRLD DEvELOPMrNrr REPORT, supra note 11, at 30-32.
42 East Asian countries may be faced with a $20 billion per year environmental clean-up
bill. "While these nations experienced unprecedented economic growth in the last decade,
pollution, congestion, waste generation and resource depletion increased 'astronomically,"
according to Guatam Kaji, the World Bank's vice president for East Asia and the Pacific.
Official Sees $20 Billion Annual Bill for East Asian Environmental Programs, 15 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 2, at 33 (Jan. 29, 1992).
43 Radetzki, supra note 33, at 131.
44 Id. at 130-32.
45 Id. at 132.
46 Patrick Low & Alexander Yeats, Do Dirty Industries Migrate?, in INTERNATiONAL TRADE,
supra note 12, at 89 [hereinafter Low & Yeats, Dirty Industries).
47 Economic density is defined as the level of economic output per capita.






The air and water in New York, Tokyo, and London are cleaner than in
Calcutta, Laos, or Mexico City.48 One recent global study Radetzki
cites found that urban air pollution tends to improve when per capita
GDP exceeds five thousand U.S. dollars (measured in 1985). 49
b. Lopez Theoy-Some Environmental Gain, Some Loss
On the other hand, other advocates of trade liberalization deny
that commercial growth necessarily benefits the environment. Accord-
ing to researcher Ramon Lopez, while technological advances, matura-
tion of economy, and growth of environmental consciousness may well
slow (or even reverse in certain sectors) the growth of environmental
damage, the net environmental effect of increased consumption is still
negative. 50 In this view, the perceived deceleration of environmental
wear does not outweigh the overall increase in consumption (and the
production necessary to sustain that consumption). The quantity of
environmental wear thus outweighs any qualitative intensity change.
Lopez offers a model to explain the relationship between economic
growth and the environment based upon "unilateral trade liberaliza-
48 Radetzki, supra note 33, at 123-127.
49 Id. at 127 (citing GENE M. GROSSMAN & ALAN B. KRUEGER, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF
A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMEN-r (1991) (paper prepared for the conference on
the United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement)).
50 Responding to a 28-year study on toxic industrial migration, Lopez concludes:
"Although toxic intensity may increase or decrease with income depending on the country
sample used, the period considered and the way in which the dependent variable is defined,
the absolute level of pollution emission invariably increases with income." Ramon Lopez, Dis-
cussant's Comments, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 12, at 87 [hereinafter Lopez, Discus-
sant's Comments].
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tion in a small open developing country."5 1 In the model, Lopez di-
vides environmental resources into two categories: those having, and
those not having, stock feedback effects in production. Economic
growth can positively affect only those resources in the first category.
i. Resources Having a Productive Stock Feedback
Effect-Possible Net Environmental Gain
This first group of resources includes forests, agriculture, and fish-
ing. They are said to have a productive stock feedback effect in that
when they are consumed, economic production is adversely affected
for some time.52 A forest's recovery from timber use is, at best, slow.
This not only affects future timber production but it may also adversely
affect agriculture (feedback effect) which may depend upon forests for
beneficial soil, reduced runoff, and so forth. Lopez believes that for
resources in this category, "economic growth and trade liberalization
in a typical developing country decrease degradation both in the short
run and long run if individual producers internalize the stock effect"53
by having this cost incorporated into the product's price by govern-
ment policy (imposition of taxes and fees), by contract, or by creating
property rights in the resource.54 In the case of property rights, as the
amount of resource dwindles, its property value correspondingly in-
creases and over-exploitation is averted. But developing countries will
need to develop effective regulatory frameworks to internalize costs. 55
Because many developing countries lack such institutions, not only
must technology be transferred to lesser-developed countries (LDCs),
but legal and economic training must be transferred as well. 56
ii. Resources Not Having a Productive Stock Feedback
Effect-Net Environmental Loss
As its title implies, this second group of resources do not directly
affect economic production when damaged.57 Air is one example.
Once emissions are reduced, air quality tends to improve quickly.
When air becomes polluted, production processes can still continue
without interruption (no feedback effect). Of course, air quality may
affect production indirectly when worker health and productivity de-
cline. Within this category, economic growth is "necessarily detrimen-
tal whether individual producers [are forced to] consider the
51 Ramon Lopez, The Environment as a Factor of Production: The Economic Growth and Trade
Policy Linkages, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 12, at 137, 138 [hereinafter Lopez, Envi-
ronment as a Factor].
52 Id. at 142-48.
53 Id. at 153.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 154.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 139.
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environmental externality or not."58 Though effective policies may re-
duce the intensity of pollution in the short run, the long-term relation-
ship remains unchanged. 59 As trade becomes more open and
economic growth occurs, production pollution 6° will decrease but con-
sumption pollution 6' will increase. 62 In other words, as an economy
matures, it will produce less pollution due to technological advances
and the natural shift away from heavy industry. With increased wealth,
however, consumers will buy and use more cars, more energy, and so
on. Hence, increased income causes net environmental
degradation. 63
3. Evidence
As with other areas of the free trade argument, "[e]mpirical evi-
dence on the effect of growth and the trade regime on environmental
degradation is quite scarce."64 One recent study does seem to provide
evidence to support Lopez's theory. The trio of Lucas, Wheeler and
Hettige studied how industrial emissions "have changed with respect to
time (1960-88), country, and trade policy." 65 Although countries with
more open trade policies were found to exhibit lower pollution levels
than more closed countries, and toxic intensity (manufacturing emis-
sions per Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) may vary with income, "the
absolute level of pollution emission invariably increase[d] with in-
come."6 6 Thus, open trade and economic growth may affect the inten-
sity of pollution, but the net volume of pollution still increases as
predicted by the Lopez theory.
Global air pollution appears to be an extreme example of the "no
stock feedback effect" idea. Carbon emissions, for example, have in-
creasingly captured the international spotlight with the global warm-
ing debate. 67 Since carbon emissions have no local effect and seem to
58 Id. at 154.
59 Id.
60 Production pollution is, as the term implies, pollution from industrial and non-indus-
trial production processes. Smoke-stack emissions, discarded industrial by-products, and irra-
diated water from nuclear plants are examples of production pollution.
61 Consumption pollution is pollution from the consumption of products. Vehicle
emissions, discarded batteries, and laundry suds are examples of consumption pollution.
62 Lopez, Environment as a Factor, supra note 51, at 154.
63 Assuming environmental costs to industry are relatively small compared to other pro-
duction costs such as labor and transport, Lopez theorizes that pollution control research
and development investment will also remain relatively small unless "developed countries
[since most technological change occurs there] force firms to fully pay for any environmental
losses that they cause." Id. at 154-55.
64 Id. at 153.
65 Robert E.B. Lucas et al., Economic Development, Environmental Regulation and the Interna-
tional Migration of Toxic Industrial Pollution: 1960-88, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 12,
at 67.
66 Lopez, Discussant's Comments, supra note 50, at 87.
67 See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Beyond Rio: "Insuing"Against Global Warning, 86 Am.J.
INT'L L. 445 (1992) (exploring options for controlling global carbon emissions).
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be important only on a global scale, there is little local incentive to
curb these emissions." Not surprisingly, data reveal that whereas local
air pollution levels have improved in many developed cities, the net
quantity of global carbon emissions is increasing. 69 As Diwan and
Shafik noted after comparing a cross section of 149 countries in 1985,
"carbon emissions per capita are rising exponentially with higher in-
comes and there is no sign of reaching a peak."70
The generation of wastes, both hazardous and non-hazardous is
another area in which economic growth has not alleviated the stress on
the environment. It is now reported that over one billion tons of haz-
ardous waste are produced globally every year with more than one
thousand new toxic chemicals being introduced annually.71 Waste-eat-
ing bacteria hold promise for future gains and lend support to
Radetzki's theory, but continued increases in toxic materials also sup-
port the Lopez net environmental loss theory.
C. Openness of National Economies and Environmental Impact
Related to the previous discussion in sections A and B is the con-
cept that a society's environmental quality is directly related to its de-
gree of openness to free trade. The core of the concept is the idea that
in a completely open situation, each nation will produce and export
what it can sell more efficiently.72 Figuring the environment into this
equation, certain countries will have a comparative advantage for pol-
luting industries based on better pollution assimilation capacities and
social tolerance of environmental pollution. Thus, migration of pollu-
tion to these countries should be encouraged, not avoided.7 3 Environ-
mentalists ridicule this idea as being quasi-religious, requiring a great
leap of faith in economic theory,74 a degree of hope that environmen-
tal degradation is not irreversible, 75 and perhaps an absence of charity
that the less fortunate should become the economically efficient
dumping ground of the world.76
68 Isach Diwan & Nemat Shafik, Investment, Technology and the Global Environment: To-
wands International Agreement in a World of Disparities, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 12,
at 263.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 275.
71 Principles for Clean Production Offered at Environmental Seminar, Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 10, at 288 (May 22, 1991).7 2 JOHN H. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 5-9
(1977). For a straightforward explanation of basic theories of international trade, see SEY-
MOUR PATTERSON, THE MICROECONOMICS Or TRADE 17-35 (1989).
73 NAFTA, supra note 4, Annex 2004.
74 The idea that the economic growth from free trade will "make all the [environmen-
tal] problems magically disappear" has been termed "trickle-down environmentalism." Special
Report: NAFFA, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 77, 83 (Jan. 8, 1992) (quoting a letter
signed by 70 Democratic members of Congress to then-President Bush from Representative
Ron Wyden).
75 It is not easy to see how any environment could assimilate nuclear or toxic wastes.
76 See Let Them Eat Pollution, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1992, at 66 (World Bank's former chief
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Fortunately, environmentalists and free trade advocates seem to
agree on one point: Government subsidies often wreak havoc on the
environment.77 By subsidizing ranches in tropical rainforest areas of
Brazil, water supplies in arid portions of the United States, or energy
supplies in Eastern Europe, governments promote economically ineffi-
cient and environmentally catastrophic enterprises. Letting the mar-
ket more directly determine the fate of economic enterprises is almost
universally encouraged, at least as to its environmental effect. 78
In a study of the diffusion of "clean" technology within the wood
pulp production industry,79 authors David Wheeler and Paul Martin
propose that "firms adopt low-polluting production technologies much
faster when national policies promote internationally competitive in-
dustrial growth."80 They focus on the development of one new tech-
nology, thermomechanical pulping (TMP), finding that whereas this
technology was developed as a result of strict environmental standards
in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries,81 it was applied more rapidly in developing countries with
open economic policies and in countries with a large-scale industry in
place.8 2 "Thus, for pulp production at least, the environment gets a
significant 'free ride' from openness even in an economy with no ex-
plicit environmental regulation."83 The implications of this study may
be limited, however, since the TMP technology is not only cleaner than
previous technology but is also more efficient.8 4 When a developing
country has a choice between a more cost effective yet dirtier technol-
economist and current Administration official, Lawrence Summers, arguing that less-devel-
oped countries may more efficiently support polluting industries because, potentially, lost
earnings from sickness and death, as well as demand for a clean environment, are lower).
77 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 15, at 36-38 (1992) (discussing
the degrading effects of agricultural subsidies), and WoRuD DEVELOPMENr REPORT, supra note
11, at 68 (condemning subsidies because they encourage inefficient exploitation of natural
resources). See also NWF President Calls for Setting Agenda, Timetable for GATT Environmental
Reforms, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Dec. 16, 1992) (National Wildlife Federation PresidentJay
Hair informing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that U.S. agricultural subsidies, like grazing
on federal lands, are environmentally destructive and should be abolished; arguing that
"C[t]rade in agricultural products should be based on their fair market value").
78 Of course, individual farmers may not be excited about the reduction of subsidies.
79 David Wheeler & Paul Martin, Prices, Policies, and the International Diffusion of Clean
Technology: The Case of Wood Pulp Production, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 12, at 197.
80 Id.
81 Directive 76/464/EEC, adopted by the European Community in 1976 stimulated ef-
fluent regulatory activity throughout Western Europe. In the United States, the Clean Water
Act of 1972 and its 1977 and 1982 Amendments set guidelines for pulp mill effluent. The
subsequent rapid increase in environmental costs conferred an important economic advan-
tage on TMP technology. Id. at 222.
82 Socialist countries (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)) and the
most price distorted developing countries first adopted the TMP technology an average of
nine years after it came on line. Less distorted developing countries adopted TMP an aver-
age of two years after it was first used in developed countries. Id. at 200.
83 Id. at 224. The early adoption of TMP in open economies is estimated to have re-
duced pulp-related pollution by 10-20% during the ten-year period studied. Id.
84 Isach Diwan, Discussant's Comments, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 12, at 225.
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ogy, it may well choose the more polluting route and still gain a com-
parative advantage.8 5
It is also debatable whether this reduction in pollution levels cor-
relates more closely to the economic or the political openness of a
country.8 6 In politically closed countries, dissidence against govern-
mental policy is limited. Information about the effects of such policy is
also limited. Hence there may be little direct pressure on the govern-
ment to alter polluting activities.8 7 This is an especially relevant ques-
tion with regard to NAFTA, even without considering its possible
expansion throughout the Western Hemisphere,88 as Mexico is not a
politically open system.89
D. Relocation of Industiy
The U.S. and Canadian governments have endeavored to split
apart the alliance of labor and environmental groups against NAFTA
by portraying NAFTA as a pro-environment agreement.90 One means
of effectuating this goal has been to argue that industries will not
achieve any competitive advantage by moving to or expanding opera-
tions in Mexico in order to avoid costs of compliance with United
States' and Canada's stricter environmental laws. According to the
U.S. government, "NAFTA will not encourage U.S. firms to relocate to
Mexico for environmental reasons because pollution abatement costs
represent a small share of total production costs in most industries."9'
This section explores whether these pollution abatement costs are in-
significant and whether more pollution-intensive industries are moving
to less developed countries.
1. Environmental Costs
If there is one rock anchoring the present political rhetoric of free
trade advocates, it is the belief that pollution abatement costs92 for in-
5 Id.
86 The figures for COMECON countries for TMP adoption in the pulpwood mill study
show the reticence of these countries to adopt clean technology. Although this was attrib-
uted to these countries being closed to economic competition, the reduction of social feed-
back and environmental knowledge within the former Iron Curtain countries seems an
equally plausible rationale for this effect.
87 For a disturbing and moving account of the environmental calamity of Communist
rule in Eastern Europe, seeJon Thompson, East Europe's Dark Dawn, NAT'L GEooAPHIc,June
1991, at 36.
88 See infra note 225.
89 According to Jorge Castaneda, a Mexican political science professor and critic of the
Mexican government: "This (Mexico] is not Canada or the United States. The Mexican au-
thoritarian political system is alive and well and living in Mexico City. People are scared to say
they disagree [with NAFrA], because there is a cost." That is why Castaneda favors linking
NAFrA with democratic reform. The Free-Trade Debate: For; Agains THE OrrAwA CrZEN,
Nov. 15, 1992, at E5.
90 NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT, sujra note 1.
91 Id. at 2.
92 Environmental or pollution abatement costs include both payments to governments
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dustry are small.93 Fundamentally, if environmental costs are dwarfed
by other business costs, such as labor and quality of infrastructure, en-
vironmental costs will be irrelevant in business translocation decisions.
According to Glenn Harrison, professor of economics at the University
of South Carolina, "pollution abatement costs are, in the aggregate, so
small a percentage of overall operating costs for U.S. industries, that
environmental costs and regulations cannot be an important factor in
the decisions of industries to migrate to pollution havens."94 A
number of studies support this view95 including one prominent study
by Patrick Low.96 Low shows that pollution abatement costs for U.S.
industries in 1988 averaged only 0.54% of output.97 The highest abate-
ment costs(1.62-3.17%) were found in the so-called "dirty industries"
related to chemical and petroleum plants, pulp and paper mills, iron
and steel foundries, primary metals, wood buildings, and cement pro-
duction. 98 Thus, the highest environmental costs for any U.S. industry
only marginally exceed three percent of its total output.
On the other hand, Duane Chapman, a professor of agricultural
economics at Cornell University, argues that environmental costs in
automobile manufacturing, silverware manufacturing, and copper pro-
duction may account for between fourteen to twenty-five percent of
total production costs.99 Chapman believes that the other studies "err
by depending upon economic census data ... which exclude a number
of potentially significant types of environmental and worker protection
costs." 100 Chapman outlines six sources of error in which macro stud-
ies exclude environmental costs:10 (1) labor-intensive activities as part
for sewage and waste disposal services, and direct operating costs for air and water pollution
control devices and waste disposal. Patrick Low, Trade Measures and Environmental Quality:
The Implicationsfor Mexico's Exports, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 12, at 105, 106 [here-
inafter Low, Trade Measures and Environmental Quality].
93 NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 2.
94 Harrison did concede that four industry groups--chemicals, paper, petroleum and
coal, and primary metals-account for 60% of U.S. industry pollution abatement costs and
might be more likely than others to take advantage of looser environmental controls in Mex-
ico. Mexico's Looser Environmental Laws Seen Attracting Few Industries, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 57, at 2182 (Dec. 23, 1992).
95 SeejJudith M. Dean, Trade and the Environment: A Survey of the Literature, in INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE, supra note 12, at 15, 15-19; M. Cropper and W.E. Oates, Environmiental Econom-
ics: A Survey, 30(2) J. ECON. LrrERATUaR 675-740 (1992) (listing additional studies on these
environmental costs).
96 Low, Trade Measures and Environmental Quality, supra note 92, at 113-14.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Duane Chapman, Environmental Costs and NAFTA 6 (Nov. 18, 1992) (presented as
testimony at U.S. International Trade Commission Hearing, Washington, D.C., and on file
with author).
100 Id. at 4.
101 Id. Sources for these excluded costs are personal interviews and visits to mines and
smelters. See id. Environmental protection activities and equipment in copper production
are also listed as: (1) air and water pollution control, coal burned for power generation; (2)
bag house on crusher; (3) berms for chemical storage; (4) covered conveyor; (5) primary
converter hoods; (6) fugitive emission hoods; (7) gas collection fans, electricity;, (8) hazard-
19931
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 19
of the production process; 102 (2) monitoring and planning activi-
ties;10 3 (3) the cost of protecting workers from environmental
hazards; 10 4 (4) productivity loss as a result of slow-downs or stoppage
because of environmental problems; (5) previous protective prac-
tices;10 5 and (6) "interest expense or opportunity cost for investment
in protection equipment."10 6
If these costs are this high, there would be great incentive for com-
panies to move polluting processes to areas of reduced environmental
regulation, and Chapman believes this explains, at least in part, the
demise of U.S. silverware manufacturing. 0 7 Without incorporating
these environmental costs into production or consumption prices or
creating and enforcing pollution standards worldwide, "we can antici-
pate exponential growth in world emissions of pollutants." 08 If Chap-
man or others can reinforce his claims with additional convincing data,
this scenario is alarming.
Both Low and Chapman focus on environmental costs in terms of
dollars spent and thus overlook an important variable in business deci-
sions, risk avoidance. In the United States, CERCLA 09 and parts of
RCRA' a0 impose strict liability on businesses involved directly or indi-
rectly in the release of hazardous substances.' 1 ' Although not all "dirty
ous waste control; (9) meteorological data and forecasting for possible pollution emergen-
cies; (10) PCB control; (11) storm catchment reservoir for ten-year storm; (12) tailing
reservoir and drain; (13) tall stack; (14) waste oil control and monitoring; (15) water dis-
charge plans and monitoring; (16) water recycle zero discharge; (17) water spray for dust
control; (18) wet scrubbers; (19) acid plant; (20) professional and environmental protection
personnel; and (21) Federal and state reports and meetings. Id. at 5.
102 This includes labor, fuel, and equipment costs of dust control in pit mines by water-
ing trucks as well as capital and labor costs of an ore conveyor's dust hood and a grinder's
fans and hoods. Id.
103 Excluded monitoring and planning activities are: (1) professional time spent with
visitors inspecting protection systems; (2) meteorological monitoring of ambient air quality;
(3) environmental planning; and (4) time and expense in report preparation and meetings
with government regulatory personnel. Id. at 4-6.
104 Work place health and safety protection costs include: (1) personal safety equip-
ment: protective jacket, hard hat, glass, respirator, and boots; (2) roll cages and cabs on
vehicles; (3) clean workplaces; (4) lights; (5) minimum train crews; (6) hearing testing, pro-
tection, and monitoring; (7) plant air testing; (8) radiation monitoring; (9) respirator test-
ing; (10) training programs; (11) mine and industrial safety personnel; and (12) mine and
industrial safety reports and meetings. Id. at 5.
105 Present managers might not recognize previous protective practices, such as respira-
tors and tall stacks, and might under-report these costs. Id. at 6.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Duane Chapman, Environmental Standards and International Trade in Automobiles and
Copper: The Casefora Social Tariff, 31 NAT. RrsoutczsJ. 449, 459 (1991). Chapman proposed
a social tariff of U.S. imports based on the degree environmental protection costs are avoided
in manufacturing imported goods, at least until a global agreement on emission standards is
reached and implemented. See generally id. at 449, 458-60.
109 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988).
110 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (1988).
111 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(u), 6928(h) (1988).
Although these sections do not explicitly mention strict liability, they have been so inter-
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industries" will be hit by liability actions, the fear of massive liability for
environmental clean-up alters industry behavior. 112 The effect of this
crushing liability potential is not completely explained by dollar
figures alone. Most other nations, including Mexico, do not have such
a strict liability scheme. Risk avoidance would provide an additional
incentive for translocating industrial processes.
2. "Dirty Industry" Migration
Whether industry migrates to "pollution havens" may be debata-
ble, but it is increasingly apparent that "dirty industry" does migrate.
Patrick Low and Alexander Yeats compared the pattern of interna-
tional trade flow composition within specific industries from 1965-
1988.113 This study reveals that although polluting industries have by
no means disappeared from developed countries, these industries have
dispersed internationally, with the greatest dispersion occurring to-
ward lesser developed countries (LDCs). 114 These LDCs have shown a
tendency to exhibit a comparative advantage for polluting industries as
opposed to non-polluting industries. 115 Thus, while dirty industry ex-
ports account for a reduced share of global trade, they still account for
a growing share of LDC exports." 6 Because of this trend among
LDCs, cost differences in environmental policies among countries
"cannot be dismissed" as a factor in dirty industry migration. 117 The
authors are quick to point out, however, that this phenomenon can be
explained by a differential in labor costs, natural resource endow-
ments, and development levels of countries as well as other factors.118
The Lucas study also concludes, like the Low study, that "develop-
ing countries as a whole had greater toxic intensity growth in the 1970s
and 1980s . . . ."119 Lucas, Wheeler, and Hettige conclude, however,
that while not "certain of a causal connection" between stricter envi-
ronmental regulation in OECD countries and the translocation and
"consequent acceleration of industrial pollution intensity in develop-
ing countries, . . . [a]ll our results are consistent with this
preted. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.
Supp. 802, 805-10 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
112 See, e.g., Supetfund: Waste or Waste Cleanup?, 6 INrT'L REs. & ENV'T 1 (1992) (ABA
describing how CERCIA has affected both the business and legal community).
113 Low & Yeats, Dirty Industries, supra note 46.
114 Id. at 98, 102.
115 This revealed comparative advantage of developing countries toward polluting indus-
try was shown to have increased 40% while that toward other less-polluting manufacturing
industries increased only 8% during the time period of 1965 to 1988. Id. at 98.
116 Id. at 102.
117 Id. at 102-03.
118 This conclusion, that the shift in dirty industry to developing countries cannot "be
adequately explained by environmental policy," again relies on the findings that environmen-
tal costs of U.S. industries are small. Id. at 103.
119 Lucas, supra note 65, at 78.
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hypothesis." 20
At the least, Chapman's study, pollution translocation studies, and
liability differences among nations cast doubt on the stability of this
"rock" of the free trade argument, especially as environmental costs for
U.S. industry continue to increase. 121
I. The Legal Structure and Procedure of NAFTA and the
Potential Impact of NAFIA on the Environment
Whereas the second part of this Comment focuses primarily on
economic arguments and evidence concerning the effect of free trade
on the environment, the third part focuses primarily on the legal struc-
ture and procedure of NAFTA and its relationship to environmental
issues. President Clinton expressed dissatisfaction with environmental
provisions of NAFTA and pushed for a parallel environmental agree-
ment,122 which was signed on September 14, 1993. This side agree-
ment builds on existing NAFTA environmental provisions including
the basic framework for dispute resolution.
Three structural and procedural parts of NAFTA have been at-
tacked. First, the NAFTA dispute resolution mechanism has come
under fire from environmentalists for its secrecy, exclusivity, and lack
of provisions for enforcement.' 23 Second, environmentalists and free
trade advocates are unhappy with aspects of the burden of proof mech-
anism.124 Third, environmentalists fear the breadth of Annex 2004,
the Nullifications and Impairment Clause. This part shall explore the
structure and procedure of NAFTA dispute resolution, the burden of
proof mechanism, and Annex 2004, the Nullification and Impairment
Clause.
A. The NAFTA Framework for Dispute Resolution
1. Legal Structure
a. Free Trade Commission
NAFTA' 25 sets up a fairly straightforward structure and procedure
for dispute resolution. 126 The main governing body is the Free Trade
120 Id. at 80.
121 The EPA estimates that pollution control costs will increase to $155 billion a year in
the United States by 2000. This would represent nearly 3% of the Gross National Product.
William Reilly, Taking Aim Toward 2000: Rethinking the Nation's Environmental Agenda, 21
ENVrL. L. 1359, 1369 (1991).
122 Proposed Commission Should Ensure Compliance with Environmental Laws, USTR Tells Com-
mitte, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 3016 (Mar. 19, 1993).
123 See infra, part III.A.3.
124 See infra part III.B.
125 See NAFTA, supra note 4.
126 See generally NAFrA, supra note 4, ch. 20. In addition to this public dispute resolution
mechanism, NAFTA also encourages each party to facilitate the settlement of private interna-
tional commercial disputes and directs the Commission to establish an Advisory Committee
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Commission (FTC).127 This commission is composed of cabinet level
representatives, or their delegates, from each participating govern-
ment.128 The main functions of the Commission are to: (1) supervise
the implementation of the agreement; (2) oversee the agreement's
further elaboration; (3) resolve disputes; (4) supervise subgroups; and
(5) perform other duties as necessary. 29
As part of these duties, the FTC will establish another group called
the Secretariat.13 0 Each nation will have its own office for its section of
the Secretariat.'' Basically, the Secretariat will facilitate the Commis-
sion and administer assistance to dispute resolution panels.'
3 2
A "roster" of up to thirty individuals with legal, international
trade, dispute resolution or other related experience, will also be es-
tablished to provide panel members for dispute resolutions.'
3 3
b. Commission for Environmental Cooperation
In addition to the FTC, a Commission for Environmental Cooper-
ation (CEC) is established through the Environmental Side Agreement
(ESA).134 While the FTC handles disputes of all kinds, the CEC is the
forum for a claim of a "persistent pattern of failure" of a party to "effec-
tively enforce its environmental law." 13 5 The CEC mirrors the FTC. It
has a Council composed of cabinet-level representatives,' 3 6 a Secreta-
riat, to assist the Council and CEC committees, 37 and a number of
advisory committees.13 8 A "roster" of up to forty-five individuals will be
maintained to serve as arbitration panelists.'
3 9
2. Legal Procedure
a. Free Trade Commission
NAFTA offers a four-step process (with one preliminary step) for
resolving disputes.
on Private Commercial Disputes to report to the Commission on the effectiveness of such
resolution procedures. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2022.
127 See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2001.
128 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2001(1).
129 See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2001, §§ (2)-(3).
130 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2002(1).
131 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2002(1)-(2).
132 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2002(3).
133 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2009.
134 North American Free Trade Agreement Draft Side Accord on Environment (BNA),
art. 8 (1), Sept. 10, 1993 [hereinafter ESA].
135 ESA, supra note 134, art. 22(1). The Council also has responsibilities to "serve as a
forum for the discussion of environmental matters," oversee the Agreement's implementa-
tion and Secretariat, and encourage party cooperation on environmental matters. ESA, supra
note 134, art. 10(1).
136 ESA, supra note 134, art. 9(1).
137 ESA, supra note 134, art. 11(5).
138 ESA, 'supra note 134, arts. 16-18.
139 ESA, supra note 134, art. 25.
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i. Preliminary Step-GAT or NAFTA?
Because the three current signatories to NAFTA also have access
to GATT dispute resolution mechanisms, 140 the complaining party
may decide whether to bring the complaint to GATT or NAFrA.141
However, if the complaint relates to Environmental and Conservation
Agreements in Article 104, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(Chapter 7B), or Standards-Related Measures (Chapter 9), the dispute
must be resolved through NAFTA upon the written request of the re-
sponding party.' 42 Once a dispute resolution proceeding has com-
menced in either GATT or NAIFTA (beyond the consultation stage),
the forum may not be changed.' 43
ii. Step One-Consultations
Any party may request consultations by contacting the other party
involved and the requesting party's section of the Secretariat. 144 As
with all requests under NAFTA's dispute resolution, the requests must
be made in writing.' 45 A third party with a substantial interest in the
issue may also join. 46 Each party will provide full information to the
other participant(s) and the parties will attempt to resolve the
dispute. 147
iii. Step Two-Meeting of the Commission
If the parties fail to resolve their dispute, any party may request a
meeting of the Commission, 148 which must then convene to hear the
matter within ten days of the request.' 49 The Commission is free to
seek input from knowledgeable outsiders (experts, technical advisers,
and the like),150 use various dispute resolution procedures, 15' and
make necessary recommendations.15 2
140 NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 2005. General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GAIT),
openedfor signatureOct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, is an international agree-
ment signed by over 100 nations to facilitate international trade. The United States is a
signing member of GATT but the U.S. Senate has never ratified the treaty. See William H.
Lash III .... In Our Stars: TheFailure ofAmerican Trade Policy, 18 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1,
8-12 (1992) (describing the erratic treatment of GATT in U.S. trade policy).
141 NAMrA, supra note 4, art. 2005(1).
142 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2005(3)-(4).
143 NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 2005(6).
144 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2006(1)-(2).
145 NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 2006(1).
146 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2006(3).
147 NAIFTA, supra note 4, art. 2006(5).
148 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2007(1)-(3).
149 NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 2007(4).
150 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2007(5) (a).
151 "The Commission may ... have recourse to good offices, conciliation, mediation or
such other dispute resolution procedures." NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2007(5) (b).
152 These recommendations are not binding but are given to "assist the consulting Par-
ties to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute." NAFTA, supra note 4, art.
2007(5) (c).
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iv. Step Three-Arbitration Panel
If within thirty days no solution arises out of the Commission
meeting, any consulting party may request the establishment of an ar-
bitration panel. 153 Once again, an interested third party may join if it
so requests in a timely fashion (usually within seven days of the request
for a panel). If the third party does not join at this time, it normally
cannot later initiate a similar dispute settlement procedure under
either GATT or NAFTA.' 54
Panel members will be selected by each party from the roster and
a party must choose only panelists who are not citizens of that party.
155
The panel will follow formal rules of procedure set up by the Commis-
sion with a minimum procedure of one hearing before the panel plus
the opportunity for initial and rebuttal written submissions.' 56 This
panel may request, with the parties' agreement, outside expert advice
and a written report from a scientific review board on a factual matter
involved.' 57 The parties may then comment to the panel on this ex-
pert advice and written report.'58 Within ninety days of the panel's
selection, the arbitration panel must issue to the parties an initial re-
port outlining any findings of fact, application of the treaty to the is-
sue, and recommendations for settling the dispute.' 59 Up to this
point, all aspects of the dispute resolution will be confidential. 160 If
the parties do not otherwise agree, the panel will issue a final report to
the disputing parties, and then the disputing parties will transmit it to
the Commission.' 6 ' This final report will be published within fifteen
days unless the Commission decides otherwise. 16
2
v. Step Four-Subsequent Actions
Upon receiving the final report, the parties will notify their sec-
tions of the Secretariat as to whether they choose to resolve the dispute
in the manner the final report requires.' 63 If within thirty days the
party judged in error by the final report has still not acted, the com-
plaining party may suspend equivalent benefits'64 under the treaty.' 65
This suspension of benefits must be closely tailored to the issue in
153 NAFMA, supra note 4, art. 2008(1).
154 NAFMA, supra note 4, art. 2008(3)-(4).
155 With two parties, the panel shall comprise five members, a chair selected by lot and
two members each selected by either party. NAFMA, supra note 4, art. 2011.
156 NAFA, supra note 4, art. 2012.
157 NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 2015(1).
158 NAFA, supra note 4, art. 2015(3)(b).
159 NAFA, supra note 4, art. 2016.
160: NAFA, supra note 4, art. 2012(1) (b).
161'; NAFA supra note 4, art. 2017.
162 Id.
163 NAFMA, supra note 4, art. 2018.
164 "Equivalent benefits" means any advantages a nation receives (reduced tariffs is one
example) through negotiating a trade agreement like NAFTA or GATT.
165 NAFMA, supra note 4, art. 2019(1).
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question 166 and can be challenged by any disputing party.167 An addi-
tional panel will then decide if the suspension is "manifestly
excessive." 168
b. Commission for Environmental Cooperation
The CEC procedure closely corresponds to FTC procedure. The
four-step CEC procedure includes: (1) Consultations; 169 (2) Meeting
of the Council; 170 (3) Arbitration Panel;17' and (4) Subsequent Ac-
tions including a monetary penalty,' 7 2 the suspension of NAFTA bene-
fits,' 73 and "manifestly excessive" review.' 74
3. Overview of Structure and Procedure
In short, the NAFTA dispute resolution process is speedy, flexible,
and informative, yet secretive and somewhat exclusive. NAFTA parties
hope to avoid the lethargy of the GATr dispute resolution process.
The average U.S. complaint to GATT takes forty-five months to re-
solve. 175 Under NAFTA, such a complaint should be resolved within
eight months.' 76 The NAFrA process is quite flexible in that parties
can agree on their own procedure and schedule for resolving a dis-
pute.177 This reflects the overall bent toward resolving disputes
166 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2019(2).
167 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2019(3).
168 Id.
169 ESA, supra note 134, art. 22.
170 The Council recommends actions the consulting parties can take to resolve their
dispute and these recommendations can be made public if two-thirds of the Council so de-
cide. ESA, supra note 134, art. 23.
171 ESA, supra note 134, art. 24. Within six months after the last panelist is chosen, the
arbitration panel makes an initial report of its fact findings, its decision as to whether a
persistent lack of enforcement of environmental laws is present, and its recommendations
and action plan for resolution of the insufficiency. ESA, supra note 134, art. 31. A final
report is then issued after written comments and published five days after the Council re-
ceives it. ESA, supra note 134, art. 32.
172 The CEC allows for an initial monetary enforcement assessment of up to $20 million
or .007% of total annual trade between the disputing parties for failure of a party to imple-
ment a CEC action plan. Any penalties are paid into a fund used to improve the environ-
ment or enforcement abilities of the party at fault. ESA, supra note 134, art. 34, annex 34.
173 A complaining party or parties may suspend NAFrA benefits of a party which fails to
pay a monetary enforcement assessment. Such a suspension cannot exceed the amount of
the assessment. ESA, supra note 134, art. 36(1)-(4). Unlike the other parties, a monetary
assessment against Canada as well as any arbitration panel action plan is enforced in a Cana-
dian court and is not subject to further domestic review. There is therefore no suspension of
NAY1A benefits with respect to any Canadian violation. ESA, supra note 134, art. 36, annex
36A.
174 CEC suspension of benefits may be challenged by the party complained against as
being "manifestly excessive." ESA, supra note 134, art. 36(5).
175 Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New
Multiculturalism, 76 IowA L. REv. 273, 301 n.141 (1991).
176 U.S. TRADE REPRE-SENTATIVE, NAFTA DisPUTE REsOLUTION FACr SHEET 1 (1992).
177 The parties may agree on: (1) time to resolve a matter through consultation,
NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 2007(1)(d); (2) time to resolve a matter before the Commission,
NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 2008(1) (c); (3) procedural rules for the arbitration panel, NAFrA,
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through consultation and mediation rather than litigation. 17 8 By pro-
viding for written input from an independent scientific review board'7 9
before any panel decision, NAFTA parties attempt to ensure that envi-
ronmental measures are properly understood and any decision is in-
formatively made. 80
Environmentalists are concerned that the dispute process is too
secretive, l8 in stark contrast with the American legal system. Only the
final report of the FTC dispute panel will be made public, 82 and the
Commission has the power to delay, or even perhaps deny, the publica-
tion of this report. 83 Environmentalists are also concerned that the
process is exclusive.' 8 4 There appears to be no opportunity for public
comment on matters before the panel (unless through a national rep-
resentative). And, despite urging from some groups,'85 no right of pri-
vate action exists under NAFTA for citizen suits and the like.' 8 6
Although there is provision for the settlement of private international
commercial disputes, 87 no real teeth are put into this system to ensure
its efficacy. Finally, environmentalists were discouraged that no trade
sanctions were included to combat environmental violations.' 88 In a
move to answer this criticism, the ESA allows sanctions against a party
which persistently refuses to enforce its environmental laws.' 89 Some
supra note 4, art. 2012(2); (4) terms of reference for the arbitration panel's findings, NAFTA,
supra note 4, art. 2012(3); (5) restricting the use and scope of a scientific review board,
NAF'A, supra note 4, art. 2015(1); and (6) terms and timing of the initial report. NAFTA,
supra note 4, art. 2016(1-2).
178 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2003.
179 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2015.
180 NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT, sup-a note 1, at 2.
181 Citizen Groups Blast Clause in NAFTA Text, supra note 3.
182 NAFTA, sup-a note 4, art. 2012(1). The vote of panelists is also to be kept secret; only
a majority and minority opinion will be issued, without names. NAFrA, supra note 4, art.
2017.
183 The wording of this subsection is somewhat ambiguous: "Unless the Commission
decides otherwise, the final report of the panel shall be published 15 days after it is transmit-
ted to the Commission." NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2017(4). The final report of a CEC
arbitral panel, on the other hand, shall be published within five days after the Council re-
ceives it. ESA, supra note 134, art. 32(3).
184 Jorge Castaneda & Carlos Heredia, Another NAFFA: What a Good Agreement Should
Offer, 1992 WORLD POL'YJ. 673.
185 House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt argued in an Oct. 23, 1991, letter to U.S.
Trade Negotiator Carla Hills that "tough, mandatory enforcement provisions, with recourse
to trade sanctions and citizen suits to force compliance with environmental and health laws
and regulations" should be added to the body of NAFTA or to a parallel agreement. Special
Report: NAFTA, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 77i 82 (Jan. 8, 1992).
186 NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 2021.
187 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2022.
188 Canadian Parliament environmental critic Paul Martin said he was "staggered" to
learn that Canadian proposals for the use of trade sanctions to combat environmental viola-
tions were rejected. "If we are to achieve a sustainable trading system, environmental protec-
tion must be as much an objective of the agreement as increased trade," he said. North
American Free Trade Agreement Greeted with Suspicion by Environmental Groups, Int'l Trade Daily
(BNA) (Sept. 10, 1992).
189 See supra notes 172-73.
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complain, though, that the sanctions process is too complex to be of
much use.190
B. The Burden of Proof Standard
A highly touted provision of NAFTA is the allocation of the bur-
den of proof to the challenging party to affirmatively establish that the
sanitary (health) or phytosanitary (plant health) measure in question
is inconsistent with NAFTA.19 1 The Bush Administration claimed that
requiring a challenging party to bear the burden of proof would en-
hance environmental protection by ensuring that stringent regulatory
laws remain viable. 192 Under NAFTA, one party is allowed to adopt
stricter health measures than another party.1 93 For example, the
United States could require a lower level of contaminants on produce
to be consumed within its borders than is required in the exporting
country. The exporting country would be faced with three choices.
First, it might show that the exporting party's measure "achieves the
importing Party's appropriate level of protection." 9 4 Second, it could
simply require its farmers to alter their production methods to fit the
U.S. standard, but this might burden exporting farmers with extra cost.
Third, the exporting country could challenge the importing party's
health standard. But to succeed with this challenge, the exporting
party would need to prove that the importing party's standard is arbi-
trary, discriminatory, or otherwise inconsistent with NAFTA. 195 Pre-
sumably this extra burden would provide a measure of protection for
U.S. and Canadian environmental and health standards.
The NAFTA burden of proof provision does not go as far as envi-
ronmentalists may have wanted, however. They had hoped that a party
challenging a national or state (provincial) environmental measure
would have to demonstrate that an "alternative, equally effective and
less restrictive measure" was available. 19 6 In other words, even when a
measure unduly restricts trade, it could be upheld if the challenger
190 Two Countries to Announce New Environmental Plan for Border Area, Int'l Env't Daily
(BNA) (Sept. 14, 1993).
191 NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 765(6).
192 NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 2.
193 The health measure selected may be stricter than a commonly accepted international
standard as well. NAFI'A, supra note 4, art. 754.
194 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 756(2) (a).
195 NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 765(6). The difficulty for the importing party is that it
should accept the exporting party's measure as equivalent to the importer's own measure
once the exporting party has provided scientific evidence that "the exporting Party's measure
achieves the importing Party's appropriate level of protection." NAFTA, supra note 4, art.
756(2) (a). Alternatively, if the importing party has supporting scientific evidence, it may
determine that its appropriate level of protection is not achieved by the exporting party's
measure. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 756(2) (b). It seems that in such a battle of conflicting
scientific evidence, the exporting party must show that the appropriate protection level is
achieved by the preponderance of the evidence.
196 Paul Martin, environmental critic for the Canadian Parliament's opposition Liberal
Party, faulted NAFrA for the lack of this "reverse onus of proof in disputes on environmental
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could not prove that a practical, less trade restrictive measure would
accomplish the same purpose.
On the other hand, more radical free traders may likewise be dis-
satisfied with these provisions. The NAFTA burden of proof combined
with escape clauses for health, safety, and the environment give some
protection for national and state (provincial) laws while still raising the
specter of trade disputes such as the EC-U.S. growth hormone in beef
dispute.' 97 One party could hide its protectionist policy behind envi-
ronmental and health measures. Then the NAFTA burden of proof
requirement would make it much more difficult for another party to
challenge the protectionist policy.
C. Annex 2004: The Nullification and Impairment Clause
Another NAFTA legal provision which has sparked controversy is
Annex 2004, the Nullification and Impairment Clause.' 98 By Annex
2004, one party may challenge another party's application of any mea-
sure (conceivably any law or policy of the challenged nation) even if
that measure "is not inconsistent" with the rest of the NAFrA agree-
ment if the questioned measure nullifies or impairs some expected
benefit the complaining party would receive from NAFrA. 199 Envi-
protection measures." Canadian Sees Missed Opportunity, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at
561 (Aug. 26, 1992).
197 This controversy concerned the European Community's rejection of U.S. beef im-
ports from cattle in which growth hormones were used to fatten cattle. The United States
contended that the EC move was an unnecessary trade obstacle in that there was no scientific
evidence proving that growth hormone use posed any health threat to humans. U.N. organi-
zations and a scientific panel commissioned by the EC had determined that no health risk
existed. Because the United States could not prove that no health threat existed, Europeans
did not arbitrarily discriminate against growth hormone-raised cattle from non-EC countries,
and Europeans feared the cancer risk from such beef, Europeans contended that the EC had
a reasonable basis for its import ban. The United States, as the challenging party, had to
carry the burden of proof. Adrian R. Halpern, The U.S.-EC Hormone Beef Controversy and the
Standards Code: Implications for the Application of Health Regulations to Agricultural Trade, 14 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 135, 148-151 (1989).
Although this fear of a country using health and environmental measures as possible
trade protectionist measures disturbs free trade advocates, the opposite effect, harmonizing
health and environmental measures down to international standards, disturbs environmen-
talists. See GAIT Language Would Undermine FlFRA, Other Environmental Laws, Groups Say, Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA) Uan. 10, 1992) (finding that the proposed Uruguay Round Dunkel Draft
of GATT, which would standardize sanitary and phytosanitary standards, would promote less
stringent national standards and undermine FIFRA's (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act) zero-risk standard for processed foods-the Delaney Clause.) See also GATT
Threatens to Preempt States'Rights to Make Policy, Annual Meeting of NCSL Told, 9 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 32, at 1344 (Aug. 5, 1992) (National Council of State Legislatures informed that
states' ability to set public standards, like Minnesota's stricter laws on the release of geneti-
cally engineered organisms, would be jeopardized by GATT and NAFTA standardization.
Karen Lehman, a representative of the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, also men-
tioned: "Most of the food and chemical standards put forth under GATT are set by the
Codex in Rome, which has pesticide standards that are 10 to 50 times less stringent than
Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and several other states.")
198 NAFTA, supra note 4, Annex 2004.
199 NAFrA, supra note 4, Annex 2004(1).
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ronmentalists cried foul when they spied this clause annexed to Chap-
ter 20 of NAFA.200 Environmentalists are afraid U.S. environmental
and consumer laws may be successfully challenged through this
clause. 201 Although the broad language of Annex 2004 seems to sup-
port this fear, the rest of the NAFTA document and the history of
GATT's Nullification or Impairment Clause undercut support for this
fear.
1. Clause Language
The language of Annex 2004 can be broken into the following
elements: (1) A party must show a benefit, (2) which "it could reasonably
have expected to accrue to it"; (3) under NAFTA provisions regarding
trade of goods or services, technical barriers to trade, or intellectual
property; (4) which "is being nullified or impaired"; (5) "as a result of the
application of any measure."202
This language is vague; any measure may be covered. Does "any
measure" mean any other part of NAFTA, any law or regulation of the
signing countries, or any internal or external policy? And what consti-
tutes a "benefit"? Must the expected benefit substantially outweigh the
value of the measure challenged or can any benefit no matter how
small qualify? Also note that the benefit need not be fully nullified,
but that a measure is contestable if the benefit is only impaired.
2. Reference to Other NAFTA Provisions
The rest of NAFTA provides a few clues to help solve this riddle.
First, any measure challenged through Annex 2004 must be chal-
lenged only through NAFTA's dispute resolution mechanism.203 As
previously discussed, NAFTA dispute resolution places a premium on
resolving disputes through consultation rather than through aggressive
judicial action. Second, NAFTA allows its parties to establish their own
independent levels of natural resource, health and safety, and environ-
mental standards20 4 unless these standards are arbitrarily or unjustifi-
ably applied in a discriminatory manner. 20 5 The ESA adds that each
party shall "ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels
of environmental protection." 206 Third, the clause must be inter-
preted in light of the overall objectives of the agreement.20 7 Although
the stated NAFTA objectives are silent as to environmental con-
200 Citizen Groups Blast Clause in NAFTA Text, supra note 3.
201 Id.
202 NAMrA, supra note 4, Annex 2004 (emphasis added).
203 NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 2004.
204 NAFMA, supra note 4, art. 904(2).
205 NAFMA, supra note 4, art. 907(3)
206 ESA, supra note 134, art. 3.
207 NAFMA, supra note 4, art. 102(2).
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cerns, 208 the preamble to NAFTA lists the resolve to: "promote sustain-
able development"; "strengthen the development and enforcement of
environmental laws and regulations"; and achieve its other goals "in a
manner consistent with environmental protection and
conservation." 20 9
3. GATT's Nullification or Impairment Clause
In substance, NAFMA Annex 2004 is comparable to GATT's Article
208 Article 102 of NAFTA provides:
The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through
its principles and rules, including national treatment, most-favored-nation
treatment and transparency are to:
(a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross border move-
ment of, goods and services between the territories of the Parties;
(b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area;
(c) increase substantially investment opportunities in their territories;
(d) provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights in each Party's territory;
(e) create effective procedures for the implementation and application of
this Agreement, and for its joint administration and the resolution of dis-
putes; and
(f establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral
cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement.
2. The Parties shall interpret and apply the provisions of this Agreement
in the light of its objectives set out in paragraph I and in accordance with
applicable rules of international law.
NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 102.
209 NAFTA, supra note 4, pmbl. The NAFTA Preamble states that the Government of
Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States, and the Government of the United
States of America, have resolved to:
STRENGTHEN the special bonds of friendship and cooperation among
their nations;
CONTRIBUTE to the harmonious development and expansion of world
trade and provide a catalyst to broader international cooperation;
CREATE an expanded and secure market for the goods and services pro-
duced in their territories;
REDUCE distortions to trade;
ESTABLISH clear and mutually advantageous rules governing their trade;
ENSURE a predictable commercial framework for business planning and
investment;
BUILD on their respective rights and obligations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other multilateral and bilateral instru-
ments of cooperation;
ENHANCE the competitiveness of their firms in global markets;
FOSTER creativity and innovation, and promote trade in goods and serv-
ices that are the subject of intellectual property rights;
CREATE new employment opportunities and improve working conditions
and living standards in their respective territories;
UNDERTAKE each of the preceding in a manner consistent with environ-
mental protection and conservation;
PRESERVE their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare;
PROMOTE sustainable development;
STRENGTHEN the development and enforcement of environmental laws
and regulations; and
PROTECT, enhance and enforce basic workers' rights....
NAFTA, supra note 4, pmbl.
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XXIII Nullification or Impairment Clause.2 10 NAFTA is to be inter-
preted "in accordance with applicable rules of international law." 211
In addition, the parties affirm their mutual rights and obligations
under GATT. 212 Therefore, it is plausible that the NAFTA clause will
be interpreted in light of the GATT clause.
GATT's Nullification Clause was originally added as an "escape
clause" provision whereby trade benefits might be suspended during
general economic upheavals such as depressions.213 GATTjudges de-
termined that complaints may be upheld when benefits could be rea-
sonably anticipated at the time a party entered GATT or negotiated its
benefits.214 For instance, if two parties agreed through GATT to re-
duce tariffs on a certain item but afterwards one country began to sub-
sidize its industry or business in the same amount as the original tariff
amount, the offended country would still be at a disadvantage by losing
the benefit it reasonably expected from its tariff concession. The subsi-
dizing party's action could be challenged under GATT's Nullification
or Impairment Clause even if its action was in conformity with the rest
of GAT. GATT judges next determined that a trade impediment is
generally considered an impairment of a tariff concession if the of-
fending party's behavior had induced reliance or if it had dealt in bad
faith.215 So although few complaints were brought under this clause,
GATT judicial decisions defined its meaning to include situations (1)
of reasonable reliance, (2) induced by the offending party, and (3)
resulting in a detriment.
210 Section 1 of GATIT's Nullification or Impairment Clause states:
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or
that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the
result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations
under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether
or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a
view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations
or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be
concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic con-
sideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
GATT, supra note 140, art. XXIII.
211 NAFMA, supra note 4, art. 102(2).
212 NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 103(1).
213 At the time of the original GATT negotiation, many feared a massive post-World War
II recession. The word "situation" was added to the list of acts causing impairment. Thus, if a
nation faced such a situation as a great depression, it would be relieved from its trade liberali-
zation duties. Robert E. Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The
New Section 301 and GATT Nullification and Impairmen4 59 MiNN. L. REv. 461, 470 (1975).
214 The "reasonably expected" language derived from a dispute over fertilizer subsidies
between Chile and Australia. Only if the original exchange of values (anticipated benefit)
between the two parties was upset would the nullification and impairment remedy be upheld.
Id. at 485-89.
215 Id. at 501.
[VOL. 19
NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT
NAFTA has codified this "reasonably expected" language absent
in GATI7.2 16 As a result, a party should not be able to challenge any
present U.S. law under NAFFA Annex 2004 because the party should
reasonably have expected the existence and effect of laws on the books
at the time of NAFTA's signing. This makes the dismantling of na-
tional or state health, safety, and environmental laws more rhetoric
than likelihood. New laws and policies, however, might come under
challenge under Annex 2004. Given the economic nature of NAFTA's
listed objectives, an outcome in such a case is not clear. Defenders of
environmental measures would gain strong support from the latitude
given to each country to form its own environmental standards, addi-
tional support from the apparent need to establish induced reliance
and bad faith, and weak supplemental support from the Preamble's
environmental policy language.
IV. Potential Environmental Effects of NAFTA
As with the overall free trade environment debate, it is difficult to
predict accurately how NAIFTA will affect the environment. A few con-
clusions can be drawn from this Comment, however.
As Mexico's economy expands from increased trade with NAFTA
parties, both the Radetzki and Lopez models forecast that Mexico's
environment will worsen in the short run.2 17 The long-term view varies
with economic theory. Radetzki's inverted-U model of decreased envi-
ronmental wear hypothesizes that as Mexico's capital increases and its
economy matures, Mexico's environmental quality will eventually im-
prove. 218 Under the Lopez model, on the other hand, the net increase
in consumption through the expanded NAFTA market will produce
net environmental deterioration because the volume of consumption
pollution will outweigh any technological and behavioral changes from
increased wealth. 219
Whatever the final effect, the more immediate results of a NAIFTA
union dominate the environment debate. It will therefore be interest-
ing to see whether NAFTA parties, especially the United States, can
convince their citizens to ignore the immediate increase in pollution
from Mexico, especially in the border region. The parties tried to ad-
dress these concerns by agreeing to coordinate and fund border infra-
structure projects dealing with wastewater treatment and water
pollution abatement.220  Neither NAFTA nor the ESA address the
216 "If any Party considers that any benefit it could reasonably have expected to accrue to it
." NAFTA, supra note 4, Annex 2004(1).
217 See supra, part II.B.2.
218 See supra, part II.B.2.a.
219 See supra, part II.B.2.b.
220 Ambassador Mickey Kantor, Announcement of NAFTA Supplemental Agreements
on Labor and the Environment, Address to the U.S. Trade Representative (Aug. 13, 1993)
[hereinafter Kantor Statement].
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concerns of Duane Chapman, 221 however. The exploitation of natural
resources is specifically excluded from CEC oversight. 222 Moving
"dirty industry" activities, such as copper mining, would still result in
substantial financial gain for a producer if Chapman is correct as to
environmental costs, and yet NAFTA would allow no oversight of Mexi-
can enforcement of its environmental laws related to mining. Serious
environmental harm could result.
Significant environmental gains and losses spring from indirect ef-
fects of the NAFTA treaty process itself and longer-term cooperation
on the harmonization of standards and other environmental issues.
On the positive side (as Lopez suggests), 223 Mexico has enacted and
begun to enforce its own environmental laws to gain support for
NAFTA,224 which shows that governmental action has occurred in an-
ticipation of NAFTA, and not as a result of it. As more nations maneu-
ver to enter NAFTA, similar responses to that of Mexico would be very
positive steps throughout the hemisphere.225
NAFTA establishes standing committees on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures226 and Standards-Related Measures 227 and en-
courages technical cooperation 228 concerning these measures. An at-
tempt is to be made to harmonize standards between the parties229
without "reducing the level of protection"230 current standards afford.
These standards are not to be waived by a party in order to favor invest-
221 See supra, part II.D.1.
222 ESA, supra note 134, art. 45(2) (iii).
225 See supra, part II.B.2.b.
224 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATiVE, M T-s & REALIurEs: THE NoRTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT (1992) (providing answers to common questions concerning NAFTA). For an
overview of U.S.-Mexican environmental enforcement, see Bruce Zagaris, The Transformation
of Environmental Enforcement Cooperation Betwn Mexico and the United States in the Wake of
NAFTA, 18 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 59 (1992).
225 Other nations anxiously wait to turn NAFTA into an American Free Trade Agree-
ment with its bounds stretching throughout the Western Hemisphere from the Arctic to the
Antarctic.
"We're [Chile] ready to get into NAFTA the day after tomorrow," said Chilean economist
Patricio Meller while speaking at McGill University. "Trade negotiations would require us to
harmonize our [Chile's] internal institutions and trade policies with those in the United
States and Canada .... This would force us to improve our record on issues related to...
the environment .... " Peter Hadekel, Chile's Economy and Long-suffering People are Ready for
Challenge of Free Trade, THE MoNTREAL GAzETTE, Oct. 31, 1992, at DI.
The Inter-American Dialogue, an assembly of one hundred leaders from North and
South America including former U.N. SecretaryJavier Perez de Cuellar, U.S. Senator Dianne
Feinstein, and Clinton Cabinet-member Henry Cisneros, urged the three NAFFA parties to
.start consulting with other nations in the Western Hemisphere on criteria procedures, and
timetables for expanding NAFTA" to form a Western Hemisphere free trade zone. NAFTA
Panel of Inter-American Leaders Calls for xtension of Free Trade, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Dec. 14,
1992).
226 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 764.
227 NAF'A, supra note 4, art. 913.
228 NAFTA, supra note 4, arts. 762, 911.
229 NAFTA, supra note 4, arts. 755(1), 906(2).
230 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 755(1).
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ment and production within its borders.23' Although cooperation and
integration do not assure environmental benefits, they may well pro-
vide vehicles for continued oversight and improvement of environ-
mental conditions through legal change, especially when
supplemented by the side agreement on the environment.232
On the negative side, however, an indirect effect that environmen-
talists fear is that NAFTA will increase the flow of petroleum from Mex-
ico to the United States and Canada. This will reduce the incentive to
pursue alternative energy sources and result in net environmental deg-
radation in the long-term. 233 Positive impact from cooperation and
integration may be shallow if regulation efforts are not continued in
these countries, and Mexican dissidents are quite skeptical of the abil-
ity and determination of the Mexican government to enforce environ-
mental laws.23 4 As Professor Jorge Castaneda said, "Legislation exists
but there is no implementation or compliance. We don't want Mexico
to become the toxic waste dump of North America."235 As Professor
Chapman testified at a U.S. International Trade Commission hearing:
In a meeting with the Director of Environmental Planning for a major
Mexican industrial city, I was told that there would be no movement to
control industrial pollution because industrial production for export
to the U.S. was the basis for economic growth. The Director noted
this comment from a Dutch industrialist: 'I do everything with waste
that I couldn't do in the Netherlands. Here I throw it in the sewers
and you don't charge me for it.'23 6
The hope is that CEC sanctions will provide a spur to encourage
Mexican environmental enforcement. Whether this spur is completely
successful, one thing is obvious: in the absence of NAFTA no provision
would exist to force Mexico to enforce its laws. Finally, any possible
environmental effects of NAFTA will be blunted somewhat by the rela-
tive weakness of the Mexican economy23 7 and the current low level of
tariffs on Mexican products. 23 8
V. Conclusion
Politicians may use economic theory for their own purposes, but
231 NAFrA, supra note 4, art. 1114.
232 The CEC is a body designed to encourage 'cooperation between the Parties" by in-
formation exchange and recommendations for increasing the compatibility of environmen-
tal law among the parties. ESA, supra note 134, art. 10(3).
233 North American Free Trade Agreement Greeted with Suspicion &y Environmental Groups, supra
note 188, at 561.
234 Jorge Castaneda, Speech at NAFrA Conference, Durham, N.C. Uan. 29, 1993).
235 1&
236 Chapman, supra note 99.
237 While NAFrA will create the world's largest market with $6.5 trillion of annual pro-
duction, most of that production will be based in the United States. See Kantor Statement,
supra note 220, at 1.
238 Before NAFrA, the average U.S. tariff on products was only 1.9% while the average
Mexican tariff on U.S. goods was about 10%. Robert Samuelson, Scare Talk About NAFTA,
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1993, at A19.
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these theories should be examined, debated, and altered as knowledge
increases. Many arguments on both sides of the NAFTA debate on
free trade and the environment have been based on little substantial
evidence. Free trade advocates tout the "trickle-down" benefits of eco-
nomic growth on the environment while environmentalists preach
their apocalyptic visions of the impact of economic growth. As this
debate continues, points of agreement, such as the dangers of agricul-
tural and industrial subsidies, the need for greater cooperation on en-
vironmental issues, and the paramount goal of sustainable
development, should be reaffirmed. From this common ground a con-
sensus can be reached concerning the continued synthesis of environ-
mental concerns with economic and legal concems. 2 9
Trade is neither a great evil nor a great salvation. Agreements like
NAFTA involve nations, not individuals. The legal and political struc-
ture within and between nations must continually be fine-tuned to
achieve desired goals of sustainable development and human dignity.
ALAN R. JENKINS
239 See Stewart Hudson, Trade, Environment and the Pursuit of Sustainable Development in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 12, at 56 (1992) (further exploring the interface of free-
market theory and environmental concerns).
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